In Arabic, the term “jihad” generally refers to “striving” or making a “determined effort,” and a “Mujahid” is someone who actively engages in jihad. To distinguish it from its pre-Islamic usage, the term jihad fi sabil Allah (striving in the path of God) is often employed to clarify that the effort is in accordance with God’s will. The religious implications of jihad have evolved and take on various meanings, especially in the Koran, where the term adapts to the changing socio-political situations during Prophet Muhammad’s time.
In the early phase of Islam, known as the Meccan period, the Prophet Muhammad’s message of jihad primarily focused on spreading Islam in the face of prevailing idol worship, paganism, and polytheism. However, after Prophet Muhammad’s migration (hijra) from Mecca to Medina in 622, and the establishment of a unified Muslim community (umma), jihad took on a more active role, focusing on both defending and expanding the Muslim community. The earlier “passive” jihad in Meccan verses contrasted with the more “active” or “aggressive” jihad seen in Medinan verses.
Thus, jihad came to be understood as both an internal and external struggle. According to a widely known, though not universally accepted, hadith (sayings of Prophet Muhammad), jihad could refer to an internal struggle against one’s sinful tendencies, known as the “greater jihad,” or it could refer to external struggles against injustice, referred to as the “lesser jihad.” Notably, many references to jihad in Sahih al-Bukhari, one of the most authoritative hadith collections, link it with armed conflict.
The expansion of Islam during the Umayyad (661-750) and Abbasid (750-1258) periods brought about a notion of jihad that was closely tied to warfare, especially in the context of the division of the world into Dar al-Islam (House of Islam) and Dar al-Harb (House of War). Legal scholars (jurists) at the time viewed jihad as an ongoing battle between Muslims and non-Muslims until Muslim rule was established over all territories, ensuring that Islam replaced other religions and created a just social order.
Within this framework, jihad took on two forms: offensive and defensive. Offensive jihad was seen as a collective responsibility to expand the reach of Islam. However, it’s crucial to note that jihad did not imply forced conversion, as the Koran explicitly states: “There is no compulsion in religion.” On the other hand, defensive jihad became an individual obligation for every Muslim when faced with foreign aggression. Jurists also acknowledged that warfare should not be endless and permitted treaties and peace agreements with non-Muslim powers.
After the Abbasid Caliphate fell to the Mongols in 1258, and the Mongol leaders eventually embraced Islam, interpretations of jihad evolved further. Some scholars, such as Ibn Taymiyyah, argued that it was permissible to rebel against a Muslim ruler who failed to uphold Islamic law. In this case, jihad was seen as a defense against corrupt rule, even within Dar al-Islam. This interpretation marked a significant shift in how jihad was understood, particularly in the 14th century, where some scholars began to advocate for armed resistance against unjust rulers.
In conclusion, jihad in the premodern period had multiple interpretations: it was a collective duty to defend and expand Islam, a means of challenging corrupt governance, and a personal endeavor for self-improvement. These different meanings have continued to evolve over time, particularly in response to colonialism and other modern challenges, deepening the concept of jihad into various political, social, and religious contexts.
The Jihad of Anti-Colonialism
In the context of early Islamic anti-colonial movements, Sunni Indian-Pakistani scholar Abu Ala Mawdudi (1903-79) expanded the definition of jihad to encompass a global movement of liberation, aiming for Islam to dominate the world and establish justice for all. Mawdudi stated:
Islam seeks control over the entire earth—not just a part, but the whole world—not to transfer sovereignty from one nation or group of nations to another, but to ensure that all of humanity benefits from the comprehensive system of welfare and ideology that Islam offers. Islam, in essence, is a program for the well-being of all people. To achieve this, Islam aims to utilize all forces capable of initiating a revolution, and the term for all these forces combined is ‘Jihad.’
Under Mawdudi’s interpretation, jihad became a universal revolutionary struggle. He also redefined the term jahiliyah, which originally referred to pre-Islamic Arabia, to mean any era or place where an Islamic state has not yet been established. Essentially, Mawdudi divided the world into two categories: the divinely-ordained Islamic world and the jahili (infidel) world, which should be conquered through jihad. For Mawdudi, jihad was not just a military effort but also a broader revolution to realize his vision of an Islamic society.
It is important to note that Mawdudi’s conception of an Islamic state excluded the Shi’a. In his book Ar-Riddah bayn al-Ams wal-Yaum (Apostasy in the Past and the Present), he referred to the Shi’a as non-believers, even criticizing the Imami Ja’fari Shia, who he described as “swimming in disbelief like white blood cells in blood or fish in water.” This view on jihad and its focus on the establishment of an Islamic state would later influence figures such as Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb, key leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, who expanded upon Mawdudi’s ideas.
Sayyid Qutb and the Islamism of the Muslim Brotherhood
Qutb drew inspiration from both Mawdudi and Ibn Taymiyyah to argue that any Muslim society under corrupt leadership is living in a state of jahiliyah (ignorance). He contended that righteous Muslims have an obligation to bring about God’s sovereignty (hakimiyah) over society. Qutb viewed the modern world as deeply immersed in jahiliyah, emphasizing:
“When we examine the foundations of contemporary living, it becomes evident that the entire world is engulfed in Jahiliyyah. All the material advancements and technological progress do not reduce this ignorance. This Jahiliyyah arises from rebellion against Allah’s sovereignty on earth. It attributes to humans one of Allah’s greatest qualities, sovereignty, and places some men above others.”
For Qutb, this modern jahiliyah demanded the same response as the Prophet’s efforts to eradicate the original jahiliyah and establish an Islamic state. This viewpoint marked a radical shift from traditional perspectives on leadership. In Qutb’s framework, Muslim rulers who were impious and failed to adhere to Islamic principles were considered unbelievers (kuffar) and, therefore, must be excommunicated from society. He condemned the leaders of the Arab world and rejected their claims to both Islamic faith and political legitimacy.
Qutb further argued that, under these circumstances, jihad was both justified and necessary against such rulers. In his influential work Milestones (Ma’alim fi al-Tariq), Qutb reinterpreted traditional Islamic concepts to justify the violent overthrow of the state. His interpretation of jihad thus became a key part of his ideology, aiming to restore God’s sovereignty on earth through political change. This broader definition of jihad deeply influenced many radical Sunni groups and fueled modern, religion-driven political movements.
One notable example is the justification for jihad against corrupt Muslim rulers by the assassins of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. In their pamphlet Al-Faridah al-Gha’ibah (The Neglected Duty), Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj argued that mainstream Muslim scholars had failed to emphasize jihad as a core religious obligation. Faraj stated that “the idols of this world can only be eradicated through the power of the sword,” drawing from the writings of Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Kathir, among others. He declared that rulers who do not govern by Islamic law are kuffar (unbelievers) and apostates, urging Muslims to take every possible step to establish an Islamic government, restore the caliphate, and expand the domain of Islam.
Following the ideological path laid out by Mawdudi, Qutb, and Faraj, Sunni Islamists redefined the context and criteria for jihad, turning it from a collective obligation to an individual one for all Muslims. These perspectives contrasted sharply with mainstream Islamic teachings, which emphasized submission to political authority, regardless of the nature of the state, and restricted jihad to defensive or corrective action, carried out only under the direction of a legitimate Islamic ruler (caliph).
The Centralization of Jihad in Jihadi Salafism
While traditional interpretations of jihad remained influential among many Muslims, a new evolution in the concept emerged from certain puritanical strains of Salafism. This movement seeks to establish a utopian Islamic state by returning to what it considers the pure practices and beliefs of the first generations of Muslims, often referred to as the “righteous ancestors.” These interpretations played a significant role in shaping the views of figures such as Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. Bin Laden, for example, took Qutb’s critiques of colonialist power structures and expanded them into a broader criticism of Western imperialism, particularly focusing on the perceived arrogance of the United States. His anger was especially directed at American involvement in Saudi Arabia, a country regarded as the heart of the Islamic world. Bin Laden’s message resonated with Muslims worldwide, broadening the scope of these ideas into a global movement, albeit still relatively small in numbers.
Within these Salafi movements, a doctrine emerged that emphasized the central role of jihad. The “Salafi-Jihadis” argue that only jihad in the service of Allah can bring about the creation of an Islamic state. This is in contrast to other forms of Salafism, such as the quietist variety, which advocates for the establishment of an Islamic state through education and social reform, as seen in the Wahhabi model in Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, activist Salafis tend to work within existing political systems, seeking to align them with their idealized vision of an Islamic state, as demonstrated by the Muslim Brotherhood’s participation in Egyptian elections. Although each of these strains shares the goal of implementing their interpretation of Islam, it is only the Salafi-Jihadis who pursue a violent form of jihad to achieve this objective.
About The Author
